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Supreme Court Economic Review Symposium on
Post-Kelo Reform

Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment
of State Responses to Kelo
Andrew P.Morriss *

The Kelo decision provoked considerablelegislative activity as 46 states adoptedlegislation on eminent domain in
its aftermath. Only about half adopted restrictionsthat
were more than symbolic, however. This paper examines
those responses using a logistic regressionanalysis and
finds that all else equal: (1) states where legislatureswere
more constrainedby tax and expenditure limits were less
likely to adopt substantiverestrictions;(2) a largernumber
of Republicans in the state legislaturemade a state more
likely to adopt a substantiverestriction; (3) overall Republican strength (as measured by gubinatorialelections) made
states less likely to adopt a substantiveresponse, suggesting
politicalcompetitiveness not ideology motivated action; (4)
there was no evidence that measures of an electorate's overall
ideology (with respect to environmental,liberal,or conservative causes) made a difference; (5) economically growing
states were more likely to adopt substantiverestrictions;and
(6) greaterdegrees of inequality andlarger African-American
populationswere not correlatedwith the type of response.
Taken together,these results suggest a public choice model of
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legislative action, ratherthan an ideologicalone, with legislaturesfacing other constraints (e.g. TEL and slower growth)
being less likely to give up valuableeminent domain powers
andlegislatures where adoptionof realreform was less costly
(fastergrowth) or more beneficial (more competitivepolitical
environments) more likely to do so.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London drew
more attention than other recent court opinions:' Professor Thomas
Merrill termed it "unique in the modern annals of law" for the overwhelming negative response,' while others noted that Kelo "fanned
into a flame" property rights rhetoric; 3 set off "a firestorm of popular
outrage;" 4 was "profoundly disquieting;"' and was one of the most
"riveting" Supreme Court decisions of the past fifty years.6 In addition to attracting critical commentary in the press, somewhat more
mixed scholarly commentary,7 and overwhelmingly critical discussion in alternative media and online,8 Kelo caught the attention of
state legislators. Indeed the majority opinion in Kelo upholding the
use of eminent domain for economic development invited legislators' attention, with Justice Stevens stressing the safeguards pro'Janice Nadler, Shari Seidman Diamond and Matthew M. Patton, Government
Takings of PrivateProperty: Kelo and the Perfect Storm in Public Opinion and Constitutional Controversy *294 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin and Patrick Egan) (forthcoming 2008), Table 12.2 (comparing Kelo and other Supreme Court opinions in terms
of press
coverage).
2
Thomas W. Merrill, Six Myths About Kelo, 20 Prob & Prop 19, 19 (2006).
3
Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v City of New London,
Sweet Home v Babbitt, and Other Tales from the Supreme Court, SSRN at [2].
1Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected PoliticalEconomy of Eminent Domain, 105
Mich L Rev 101, 103 (2006). See also James W. Ely, Jr, Kelo: A Setback for Property
Owners, 20 Prob & Prop 14, 14 (2006) (also terming reaction "a firestorm").
I Ely, 20 Prob & Prop at 14 (cited in note 4).
6Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original,8 Green Bag 2d 355, 355 (2005).
7Property
rights proponents such as Richard Epstein found it "ill-considered,"
Richard A. Epstein, The Public Use, The Public Trust, & Public Benefit, 9 Green Bag
2d 125, 125 (2006), while academic defenders such as Thomas Merrill argued that Kelo
represented nothing new. See Merrill, 20 Prob & Prop at 19 (cited in note 2).
8See, example, Scott Johnson, Takings: An Introduction,Powerline (June 23, 2005),
online at http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/010822.php (leading conservative
blog concluding that "The jurisprudence represents the Court's accommodation of government power over individual rights."); Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissmann,
Focus on the Corporation,Eat the State! (July 6, 2005), online at http://eatthestate
.org/09-22/FocusOnCorporation.htm (leftist authors argued that "eminent domain
in economic development cases is a tool that, as an empirical matter, facilitates benefits only for the rich and powerful. It is a tool that should be checked.").
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vided by the political process, 9 noting the inadequacy of the judiciary

to review the use of eminent domain, 0 and refusing to be drawn into
a debate over the merits of the use for which the property was being
taken,"' while "emphasiz[ing] that nothing in our opinion precludes
any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the tak-

ings power.' 2 In the two years after the June 23, 2005 decision, legislation to restrict eminent domain powers was introduced in forty9The majority stressed the extensive process undertaken by the New London
Development Corporation ("NLDC") and the extensive review of those plans by
various state agencies and city bodies. The planning process was approved by the city
council, neighborhood meetings were held "to educate the public about the process,"
an "integrated development plan" was prepared by the NLDC, and "various state
agencies studied the project's economic, environmental, and social ramifications"
using "a team of consultants" to evaluate "six alternative development proposals for
the area, which varied in extensiveness and emphasis." Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655, 2659 &
n 2. The existence of "a 'carefully considered' development plan" and lack of "evidence of an illegitimate purpose" took the Kelo facts out of the forbidden category of
takings aimed at simply transferring benefits from one owner to another, based on a
"mere pretext." Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655, 2662. The lack of "a particular class of identifiable individuals" who benefited from the plan was further evidence that the development plan had a public purpose.
"°The majority thought courts incapable of evaluating the "diverse and always
evolving needs of society" that might motivate the use of eminent domain powers.
Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655, 2662. Quoting extensively from a particularly vapid 1954 opinion
by Justice William 0. Douglas, the majority noted that "[tihe concept of public welfare
is broad and inclusive ....The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655, 2662. Moreover,
"the needs of society have evolved over time in response to changed circumstances."
Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655, 2663. Faced with this broad array of potential community values,
the Kelo majority held that "empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less
than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to
be carried out in the federal courts." Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655, 2667. The question was thus
whether New London's plan fell within the "broad and inclusive" boundaries of permissible public purposes, a question that has only one realistic answer outside of the
most blatant examples of rent-seeking. (Justice Thomas's dissent terms this "affording
almost insurmountable deference to legislative conclusions that a use serves a 'public
use."' Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655, 2684 (Thomas, J., dissenting).) Legislatures, not courts,
were the proper forums to debate the merits of advantaging one type of property use
over another.
" The majority refused to review the details of the development plan, such as the
inclusion of the individual properties within the development plan, again holding that
the courts lacked the capacity to review such determinations. Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655,
2668. Again quoting Justice Douglas's opinion in Berman, the majority concluded that
"[o]nce the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character
of the land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the
integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch." Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655,
2668, quoting Berman, 348 US at 35-36.
12 Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655, 2669.
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six states, with multiple bills in many states, and forty-two states
enacted legislation or constitutional amendments restricting the use
of eminent domain.
However, all legislative responses to Kelo were not equal. Some
states adopted symbolic legislation, making no significant change in
the substantive constraints on the exercise of eminent domain powers by the state or local governments. For example, while Connecticut
amended its statutes to require a two-thirds vote of the government
body proposing to take the property, give former owners rights of first
refusal to buy back properties if the projects for which the properties
were taken fell through, and restrict the use of eminent domain for
the "primary purpose" of increasing local tax revenue,13 these changes
did not pose a significant obstacle to the exercise of eminent domain
powers. 14 Indeed, in my judgment the taking at issue in Kelo would
have not been prevented by any of these three changes.' However,
some states adopted substantive changes that did reduce the ability
of state and local governments to use their eminent domain powers. For example, Florida adopted legislation that effectively forbade
local governments' use of eminent domain to eliminate blight and required municipalities to wait ten years before transferring any property acquired through eminent domain to a private owner16 as well as
a state constitutional amendment that required a three-fifths major3

"An Act Revising The Process For The Taking Of Real Property By Municipalities For Redevelopment And Economic Development And Revising The Process For
Providing Relocation Assistance For Outdoor Advertising Structures Acquired By The
Commissioner Of Transportation," 2007 Conn Legis Serv PA 07-141 (SSB 167).
14Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform
Legislationsince Kelo 11 (August 2007) online at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/
publications/report-card/50_- StateReport.pdf ("Unfortunately, SB 167 [the Connecticut reform legislation] offers no substantive property rights protection .... Without
stronger eminent domain reform, Connecticut continues to have some of the most
broad and easily abused eminent domain laws in the nation.").
"The first refusal provisions would have been irrelevant, since Kelo involved the
initial taking, not the collapse of a project and distribution of the land. The limit
on takings with the "primary purpose" of increasing local tax revenue would have
been irrelevant as the Supreme Court majority accepted New London's claim that the
development plan was "projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and
other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas." 125 S Ct at 2658. Finally, the 2/3rds vote requirement,
although not satisfied in Kelo because it did not apply at the time, likely would not
have presented a problem, as the development plan was not the subject of any significant opposition from any New London officeholder. Moreover, the New London City
Council voted 5-2 to evict the Kelo plaintiffs after its victory in the Supreme Court,
some evidence that the initial plan would have had similar support. Elizabeth Mehren,
New London Council Votes to Oust Eminent Domain Holdouts, LA Times (June 7,
2006).
16
An act relating to eminent domain, 2006 Fla Sess Law Serv Ch 2006-11 (HB 1567).

Andrew P. Morriss

241

ity vote in both houses of the state legislature to grant exemptions
from these requirements. 7 Why the difference? Why did some states
adopt meaningful reforms of eminent domain while others did not?
One possibility is that some states are simply more protective of
property rights than other states. Perhaps Texas, with its long history of private property, 8 was simply more likely than Florida, with
its more transient population and state-wide land use planning, to
protect its citizens' homes from eminent domain abuse for cultural
reasons. Yet Texas scored a C- while Florida received an A on the
Castle Coalition's "Report Card" on eminent domain reform.' 9 Any
such link was thus more subtle than such crude stereotypes. And
the correlation between real, substantive reform of eminent domain
and legislative responses to protect property rights from regulatory
takings was not particularly high: only 12 of 23 states adopting one of
those earlier reforms adopted substantive eminent domain reforms in
the two years after Kelo, while nine of the 27 not adopting one of the
earlier reforms adopted an eminent domain reform after Kelo. Thus
only 60% of the states' records on the two sets of property rights
protections matched up, a Pearson correlation coefficient of just 0.19,
well below the level for statistical significance. See Table 1.
To explain why states differed in their responses, I focus on the
costs and benefits of restrictions on the use of eminent domain for
those voting on the reforms: legislators. Three aspects are most important. First, although Kelo revealed that eminent domain was unpopular with the public at large, 20 there remained an important constituency that supports its use: government officials. Its supporters
see eminent domain as a "vital economic development tool" 2' for
state and local governments, allowing important redevelopment
projects to take place and potentially saving local communities from
economic decline or worse. 2 To its opponents, eminent domain is a
Const Art X, sec 6(c).
"1See Andrew P. Morriss, Returning Justice to Its Private Roots, 68 U Chi L Rev
551, 567-70 (2001) (describing role of private property rights in development of Texas
17Fla

land use).
9The report card and the organization are described in more detail below. See notes
41-44 and associated text.
I°Nadler, Diamond & Patton, Government Takings of Private Property at *287
(cited in note I) ("An overwhelming majority of citizens were astonished and disby the decision" in Kelo).
mayed
21
Eddie A. Perez, The Importance of Eminent Domain in Community Development Projects, 29 W New Eng L Rev 109, 109 (2006) (Perez is mayor of New London,
Connecticut).

n Most eminent domain projects are taken by local governments. However, state
governments also are intimately involved in many economic development projects
in three ways. First, state funding and tax incentives often provide an important part

242

Symbol or Substance?

Table 1. Correlation of Eminent Domain Reform with Regulatory
Takings Measures
Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform

Regulatory Takings
Reform Legislation

Did not adopt
Adopted

Did not adopt

Adopted

18 (36%)

9 (18%)

11(22%)

12(24%)

means of redistributing property from one set of owners to another,
providing politicians with a valuable resource that can be exchanged
for support. Professor Ilya Somin, for example, argues that economic
development uses of eminent domain are "especially vulnerable"
to rent-seeking because of their "nearly limitless" rationale, "low
transparency," and the long time horizon necessary to discover the
lack of public benefits.2 However much they might disagree on the
motives for its use, both proponents and opponents agree that eminent domain is an effective means for redistributing property rights
from one set of owners to another. As a result, it has positive value
for legislators and will be abandoned only if the costs of doing so are
offset by some benefit to the legislators.
Second, reforming eminent domain in the direction desired by the
public is not difficult. Not only did multiple states adopt effective
restrictions on eminent domain powers, but property rights activists, including the Institute for Justice's Castle Coalition, provided
clear, straightforward model legislation that showed any legislator
of the total package. In Kelo, for example, Connecticut provided $15.35 million in
bond issues to support the New London plan. 125 S Ct at 2659. Second, the local
politicians involved work closely with their areas' state legislators in both politics

and governance. See, for example, Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower
Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 Yale L J
2542, 2567 (2006) (program specific funding mechanisms used widely increases "state
and federal politicians involvement in local affairs" but such funds "are necessary to
achieve many city ends."). Third, there is considerable movement between state legislatures and local governments, with city council members and county commission-

ers frequently shifting to the legislature and legislators sometimes becoming mayors.
Because of these close political and substantive ties between state legislators and local

government officials, restrictions on one's feasible policy set affect the other as well.
Thus if local officials are unable to use eminent domain to lower the cost of economic
development projects, they will look to the state legislature for additional funding for
the projects.
13Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings
After Kelo, 15 S Ct Econ Rev 183, 201-03 (2007).
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interested exactly how to restrict the use of eminent domain. 24 As a
result, any state legislature that wished to do so could have passed an
effective reform of eminent domain. The cost of passage was thus not
drafting or considering legislation but the constraints imposed by the
reforms on politicians' future uses of eminent domain.
Third, the costs of the constraints vary across states. Eminent
domain provides a way of reducing the cost of economic development/rent-seeking (depending on one's perspective). 2s Where there
are more (fewer) other means of obtaining those benefits, a legislature
will find accepting constraints on eminent domain less (more) costly.
Where interest groups favoring the use of eminent domain to accomplish their goals are stronger (weaker), legislators will find it more
(less) costly to impose restrictions that frustrate those uses. Likewise, stronger (weaker) groups opposing eminent domain use will
increase (decrease) the cost in political support for legislators' votes
against substantive reforms. Where the economic "pie" is expanding
(shrinking), legislators will have more (fewer) other opportunities to
generate rewards for their supporters. As a result, effective restrictions on eminent domain legislation add a constraint that restricts
state and local governments in pursuit of the public interest and rentseeking alike that is more likely to be binding when the legislature
is restricted in raising revenue through tax increases or the state's
economy is not growing. And additional constraints will cost legislators more or less in terms of support when the balance between
eminent domain's supporters and opponents is different.
Faced with a popular, straightforward measure to protect property rights, legislatures behaved differently. In this Article, I argue
See, for example, Castle Coalition, Model Languagefor State Statutes Limiting
Eminent Domain Abuse, online at http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/model/
statestatute.html.
25 Economic development projects present a special case of eminent domain with
respect to many problems. Where a government takes property for a classic public
good (e.g. highway, park, school), there may be questions about the distribution of the
benefits but the result of the taking is an asset theoretically available for use by any
member of the public. In economic development cases, on the other hand, the property
taken is generally either given directly to a private owner, often at a subsidized price,
or used to primarily benefit a private property owner by creating support infrastructure
for the private property owner's project. In these cases the potential for rent-seeking
is magnified since the power of government is used to redistribute assets from one
property owner to another, raising what Epstein aptly terms "the endemic problem
of self-dealing." Epstein, 9 Green Bag 2d at 128 (cited in note 7). This redistribution is
perhaps partly the cause of the hostility to Kelo: "much of the reaction to the decision
evinced hostility to the notion that local governments should ever condemn privately
owned property and convey it to private developers in the name of economic development." Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local PoliticalProcess,34 Hofstra L Rev 13,
13 (2005).
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that the reason for the differences in state responses lie with these
differences in the costs to state legislators of anti-Kelo restrictions
on eminent domain powers. This Article uses the variation in state
responses to Kelo to extend the explanation to the question of why
some states responded with effective legislation while others did not.
Using statistical analysis, I examine whether measures of states' political climate and of the other constraints on legislatures explain the
variation in results. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis
that the different responses to Kelo are, at least in part, based on the
different costs of accepting restrictions on a politically useful means
of distributing resources to supporters.
The regressions provide three important results. First, spending and revenue restrictions make substantive reforms less likely,
supporting the thesis that what matters in determining whether a
substantive reform succeeds is the impact on legislators. Second,
legislatures in growing states were more likely to adopt reforms than
legislatures in stagnant and declining ones. This is consistent with
the legislative cost explanation as well as with alternative theories
discussed below. Third, the impact of politics is important. Greater
Republican support in the legislature increased the chances of substantive reform. However, holding the degree of legislative control
by Republicans constant, greater Republican political strength made
substantive reforms less likely to pass. And measures of the ideological climate were insignificant. Taken as a whole, these results are
consistent with a non-ideological explanation for the relative success
of substantive reform.
II. VARIATIONS IN STATE RESPONSES
The "public outcry ' 2 6 over the Kelo decision produced legislative
responses in many states remarkably quickly.27 These responses differed in a number of particulars, but I focus on three dimensions
as most important in distinguishing a substantive from a symbolic
effort: restrictions on the use of eminent domain for economic development, restrictions on the use of blight designations as a justifica2 Epstein,

9 Green Bag 2d at 125 (cited in note 7).

27Professor Ely suggests that the rapid legislative response developed "because
ordinary people realized for the first time that their homes and businesses were susceptible to aggressive exercise of eminent domain for economic development projects." Ely, 20 Prob & Prop at 14 (cited in note 4). The timing of the responses varied in
part because of the different meeting schedules, with some legislatures like Montana's
not in session until months after the Kelo decision. Castle Coalition, 50 State Report
Cardat 30 (cited in note 14).
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rather than
tion for eminent domain, and adoption of constitutional,
28
merely statutory, restrictions on eminent domain.
Much of the outrage over Kelo stemmed from New London's decision to sacrifice individuals' homes for a corporate development. As
Justice O'Connor put it in her dissent, after Kelo "[niothing is to
prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton,
any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory. 21 9 And
the legal attack on the use of eminent domain in Kelo centered on the
question of whether Susette Kelo's property was taken for a "public
use" and whether the Constitutional text imposed a substantive
requirement or not.30 The Supreme Court's majority found that it did,
in essence holding that the Constitutional requirement of a "public
use" imposed few, if any, limits on the exercise of the power of eminent domain. On the other hand, eminent domain's use for more
traditional school, road, bridge, and other infrastructure projects is
far less controversiaP and seems less likely to be abused so long as
compensation is required and paid. To eliminate the abuse without
preventing the relatively noncontroversial "good" uses of eminent
domain, state legislatures can limit the purposes for which eminent
domain was used by adding language to their eminent domain stat2 See Noel D. Campbell, R. Todd Jewell, and Edward J. Lopez, Passa Law,Any Law,
Fast! The States' (Somewhat) Symbolic Response to the Kelo Backlash, 44, "Attachment to Appendix" (October 2007) online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022385 (categorizing laws on 18 dimensions). Note that since I am focusing on legislative action, I
count only reforms that pass through states' legislatures, not those that do not involve
legislative votes such as amendments passed only through citizen-initiated initiatives.
See note 44.
29
Kelo, 125 S Ct at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3
0Id at 2658 ("The question presented is whether the city's proposed disposition of
this property qualifies as a "public use" within the meaning of the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.") Scholars as diverse as Professor Merrill
and Professor Adler argue that the "public use" language is not a substantive bar to
economic development takings. See Merrill, 20 Prob & Prop at 21-22 (cited in note
2) (suggesting the reading of "public use" most likely to reflect the framers' intent
would have been as "descriptive of the power of eminent domain"); Jonathan H. Adler,
Property Rights & Wrongs, National Review Online, June 29, 2005, online at http://
www.nationalreview.com/adler/adler200506290806.asp (expressing skepticism that
the3 Constitution's text bars economic development takings).
1 Nadler, Diamond and Patton, Government Takings of PrivateProperty at *301
(cited in note 1) (noting public support for some forms of eminent domain and concluding that "beneath the vigorous public opposition to Kelo lay a more nuanced
evaluation of government takings-a complex structure of public attitudes not easily
gauged at an abstract level by simply measuring attitudes toward eminent domain in
general"). There is also a history of eminent domain's use for things like grist mills
that would certainly have been vulnerable to rent seeking. See Richard A. Epstein,
Takings (1985) at 172-73 (noting courts' misgivings about allowing takings in grist
mill cases).
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utes or state constitutions that defines "public use" more restrictively by specifically excluding particular types of uses. For example,
Florida restricted on transfers of property taken by eminent domain
to private parties for ten years after the taking, banned blight takings, and imposed super-majority requirements on the legislature for
exceptions, resulting in what the Castle Coalition termed "sweeping reforms [that produced] ... some of the best protection in the

nation. "32
Once attention was focused on eminent domain abuse by Kelo,
property rights activists argued that the use of a "blight" designation as a justification for taking property that by many Americans'
standards was clearly not blighted in any usual sense of the word was
another major problem, even though New London had not made use
of a blight designation in Kelo.33 High profile cases like Lakewood,
Ohio's blight designation of properties that lacked "two bathrooms,
three bedrooms, an attached two car garage, central air-conditioning,
3 4
or if the house or yard didn't meet minimum size requirements
caught the popular imagination as well.35 But the elasticity of the
definition of "blight" that so outraged many people was a feature,
not a bug, from the point of view of economic development officials
in many state and local governments. In Lakewood, "the mayor
maintained that [blight] is a term of art, or a statutory phrase generally invoked to describe whether or not the structures in the area
'meet today's standards,' and that the designation was necessary to
enable the city to exercise its eminent domain powers.", 6 Restricting
the use of blight designations as a justification for eminent domain
would thus be a costly substantive restriction precisely because it
would prevent eminent domain's use for projects like Lakewood's,
projects that economic development officials and experts continued
to support despite public outrage.
Finally, responses differ in whether they are statutory or consti3

2Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Cardat 13 (cited in note 14).

125 S Ct at 2660.
1 Patricia E. Salkin and Lora A. Lucero, Community Redevelopment, Public Use,
and Eminent Domain, 37 Urb Law 201,219 (2005) (citing WCBS Newsradio 880, Eminent Domain: A 60 Minutes Special Report, Sept. 28, 2003, online at http://wcbs880
.com/rooney/sixtyminutes-story_271210317.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).).
" The Lakewood dispute was covered on CBS' News program 60 Minutes and in the
Washington Post. See Eminent Domain: Being Abused?, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2003/09/26/60minutes/main575343.shtml; Blaine Harden, In Ohio, a Test for
Eminent Domain, Wash Post at A03 (June 22, 2003).
1 Salkin and Lucero, 37 Urb Law at 221 (cited in note 34). It is possible, of course,
that a stringent blight requirement would act as a check on eminent domain abuse by
allowing property owners to challenge a blight designation as arbitrary. The looseness
of blight requirements mean that blight appears to have been more often used as an
excuse than functioned as a constraint.
-Kelo,
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tutional restrictions on the use of eminent domain. Constitutional
changes are more durable than statutes, but also more expensive to
procure.37 A constitutional amendment restricting eminent domain
was thus a more costly response for the state legislature because it
38
would be harder for the legislature to weaken it in the future.
Legislators could choose between symbolic and substantive reforms because, despite the widespread popular distaste for Kelo itself
which made adopting some form of "reform" a politically popular
37

Profs. Donald Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard's analysis of federal constitutional
amendments predicts that interest groups are willing to incur the costs of obtaining
constitutional provisions when the groups have high "maintenance costs" or expect
opposition to their proposal to grow in the future. See Donald J. Boudreaux and A.C.
Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution:An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional
Amendment Process, 62 Fordham L Rev 111, 118-21 (1993). "Maintenance costs"
refer to the cost of maintaining the group's coalition to protect its gains. Interest
groups with "[hjigh maintenance-costs... will not anticipate being an effective political force in the future." As such, they "are likely to demand the greater durability provided by amendments." Id at 119. Temporary groups face higher maintenance
costs than those already organized for other reasons. Boudreaux and Pritchard use the
example of those who supported Prohibition (a high maintenance cost group, allied
only for ideological reasons) and labor unions (low maintenance cost). The latter can
anticipate being able to regularly lobby the legislature and so is willing to accept the
cheaper alternative of legislation to accomplish its goals; the former has a serious
free-rider problem in maintaining its coalition and so will prefer the more durable, but
costly, constitutional amendment. Id at 119-20. The prospect of opposition arising in
the future also enhances the desirability of an amendment. Where the losers from the
policy are unknown today, but will be identified as a result of the policy going into
effect, enshrining the policy in a constitution, which is difficult to change, rather than
in a statute is more likely to be worthwhile. Id at 122. The opposition to Kelo presents
a situation with high maintenance costs; the outrage spawned by the decision was
likely to dissipate over time as other events overtook it in the news, giving property
rights groups an incentive to seek a constitutional change to lock in their gains.
3' Utah's experience demonstrates this point. The legislature passed a stringent
eminent domain reform before Kelo in 2005. In 2007, however, the legislature weakened the statute. Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card at 48 (cited in note 14). A
variant on this applies to the anti-Kelo legislation. The absence of a vigorous public
political defense of Kelo (as opposed to a public "it is right on the law but wrong on
the policy" position) suggests that the opposition to it is more likely to surface in
back-channel ways. The political price paid by some eminent domain supporters in
recent years (e.g. the 2004 Lakewood, Ohio mayoral election in which a high-profile
supporter of eminent domain was defeated by an opponent who suggested he was at
most ambivalent about the issue) is a further reason for those opposed to restricting
eminent domain to work behind the scenes rather than in a public debate. Another
distinction among responses lies in the source of the restriction. In most states, the
response to Kelo came in the form of legislative proposals; in some, however, it came
through citizen initiatives. (Of course, initiatives are available only in a minority of
states, and the requirements to put an initiative on the ballot vary considerably from
state to state, even among those which do allow citizen-initiated initiatives.) The
presence of an initiative often spurs state legislatures to propose their own measures,
to head off features of the initiative that they dislike.
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step, voters often did not distinguish symbolic from substantive
reforms. It seems likely that the Kelo backlash did not mean a wide39
spread public rejection of eminent domain in all circumstances.
Clearly voters could make such distinctions, they simply did not.
Professor Ilya Somin persuasively makes the case that the lack of
effective legislative responses to Kelo is attributable in part to voters'4
rational ignorance about the substance of eminent domain reforms. 0
3

9 Nadler, Diamond and Patton argue that public opposition to eminent domain is
more nuanced than the visceral reaction to Kelo indicated.
Beneath the vigorous public opposition to Kelo lay a more nuanced evaluation of government takings-a complex structure of public attitudes not easily gauged at an abstract level by simply measuring attitudes toward eminent
domain in general. In particular, the level of support for the use of eminent
domain appears to depend on, among other things, the nature of the property
(homes, vacant land, etc.) and the proposed use of the property (a school, a shopping center, etc.). The complete rejection of eminent domain by 40% to 60% of
respondents answering a general question probably reflects the salience of the
Kelo facts and the outrage in response to its perceived unfairness rather than a
wholesale rejection of the legitimacy of eminent domain.
Nadler, Diamond and Patton, Government Takings of PrivatePropertyat *301 (cited
in note 1).
40Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash:Assessing the PoliticalResponse to Kelo, 93
Minn L Rev 2100 (2009). Opponents of reforms have explained the reforms popularity
through voter ignorance as well. See, for example, Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine,
Measure 37 and a Spoonful of Kelo: A Recipe for PropertyRights Activists at the Ballot Box, 38 Urb Law 1065, 1070 (2006) ("The overall result is that regulatory takings
laws are presented to an electorate unequipped with the legal education or motivation
to truly understand them amid a barrage of positive depictions. Often, this presentation is accomplished through highly financed media campaigns that drown out a disorganized opposition relying on complicated and emotionally unappealing policy arguments. Furthermore, the task of responding to property rights activists with opposing
public policy arguments often falls on state and local governments, which are simply
ill-equipped and lack the resources to do so."). Property owners are the classic large
and diffuse group, likely to fall victim to rent-seeking because the costs of organizing
them are high and the expected loss to each ex ante is relatively small. Property owners' interests in eminent domain reforms are twofold. First, if eminent domain powers
are to be used, they want to maximize their own compensation, while minimizing the
chance of over-compensation generally (which will increase the cost of projects that
do not involve their own property). Second, they would like to minimize the chance
of their own property being taken involuntarily. Based on the public reaction to Kelo
it appears that when property owners pay attention to the issue, this latter interest dominates. Because these interests point in different directions, and because the
chance of any particular individual's property being involuntarily taken is so small,
the large, diffuse group of property owners generally plays the role that large, diffuse
groups generally play in public choice analyses: they do not pay attention to eminent
domain issues. The exception is when an event makes members of the general public
pay attention to the issue. At this point, the issue is not whether the eminent domain
question is resolved according to precedent but whether the political or legal system
delivers the result the property owner wants.
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Somin's argument supports the assumption here that it is primarily
the costs and benefits to legislatures that matters in determining the
states' responses.
To convert the states' diverse responses into a variable capable
of being statistically analyzed, I turned to a "report card" on eminent domain reform produced by the Castle Coalition, a "nationwide grassroots property rights activism project" of the Institute for
Justice (which represented Ms. Kelo in the Kelo litigation)41 involved
in organizing efforts to obtain eminent domain reforms. The Coalition graded states on a scale from A to F for their passage of eminent
domain reform measures through June 2007.42 The Coalition's grades
rested on a thorough analysis of each state's legislation, with heavy
emphasis on the three criteria discussed above. I collapsed the twelve
categories of grades (A to F, with intermediate + and - steps) into a
dichotomous variable: ReformB (1 if the state received a B- or better, 0 otherwise).4 Table 2 lists the states' Castle Coalition grades.
Twenty-one of the states received a B- or better. Note that since my
analysis focuses on legislatures' actions, I exclude from the statisthe reforms resulted solely from
tical analyses those states where
44
citizen-initiative and referenda.

4' Castle Coalition, About Us, http://www.castlecoalition.org/profile/index.html.
'2 Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card (cited in note 14).
13 An alternative approach would have been to use an ordered logit regression, capturing the additional information in the variations between the individual grades.
This proved impossible, however, as the relatively small size of the dataset (limited
to 50 states) meant that there were too many "empty" cells to conduct the regression.
Another reason to avoid an ordered logit would be its imposition of the assumption of
equal distance between the various grades, making the distinction between a B- and
a C+ the same as the distinction between a D- and an F. After reviewing the Castle
Coalition narratives, I determined that this was not supported by the data.
4Four states have adopted eminent domain reforms through citizen-initiated
methods: Arizona, Nevada, North Dakota, and Oregon and so pose a classification
issue. (Some other states adopted reforms through multiple methods.) In addition,
Utah had adopted a reform measure prior to Kelo and so poses a slightly different classification issue. In Arizona, the legislature had passed equivalent legislation that was
subsequently vetoed by the governor. The initiative campaign essentially overrode
the governor's veto and so I include Arizona in the analysis, since its legislature voted
on and passed the legislation. Nevada's legislature adopted a statute implementing
the initiative before its effective date. Admittedly the decision to pass such a measure
was likely influenced by the election results, but the legislature's action still merits
its inclusion in the analysis as it could easily have opted to simply allow the measure
to go into effect on its own. Utah's legislature passed legislation addressing eminent
domain issues (weakening its previous reforms) and so it merits inclusion. I opted
to include Arizona, Nevada, and Utah in the analysis and to exclude North Dakota
and Oregon. Excluding these states entirely did not change either the sign or relative
magnitudes of the coefficients.
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Table 2.

State Grades on Post-Kelo Reforms

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois

Grade
B+
D
B+
F
DC
D
DA
B+
F
D+
D+

State

Grade

State

Grade

State

Grade

Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

B
BB
D+
B
D+
D
F
ABF
D

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
N.H.
N.J.
N.M.
N.Y.
N.C.
N.D.
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania

D
D+
B+
B+
F
AF
CA
D
F
B+
B-

Rhode Island
S.C.
S.D.
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

F
B+
A
DCB
DB+
CCC+
B

I constructed the dependent variable from the Castle Coalition's
grades for two reasons. First, the grades were constructed by people
intimately involved in the process of seeking reform legislation and
so reflected a thorough understanding of the legislation. And, since
the group intended its grades to be used in lobbying efforts, there
were incentives for the group to accurately characterize the legislation. The narrative descriptions of each state's legislation explained
why the score was assigned, making the scoring process transparent.
Second, the grades combined multiple characteristics of the legislation into a single score,45 a crucial component in constructing an
"The Castle Coalition grades differed significantly from the scale constructed by
Campbell, Jewell, and Lopez, Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! at Table 1 (cited in note
28). Campell, Jewell, and Lopez examined eighteen characteristics of state laws, then
summed the criteria, essentially assigning a positive value of 1 to each restriction and
a negative value of 1 to each loophole. States with a net positive value received a score
of 2, states with a score of less than 0 received a score of 1, and states with no statute
(and so a score of 0) received a score of 0. Id at * 10. The authors then used an ordered
probit to examine the pattern of response.
There are two important sources of difference between the Campbell, Jewell, and
Lopez score and the Castle Coalition grades. First, the Castle Coalition grades focus
primarily on effective restrictions on blight and economic development uses of eminent domain and on whether the reform was put into the state constitution or not.
Campbell, Jewell, and Lopez did not assign weight to the constitutional dimension at
all and assigned equal values to each of the characteristics they included. As a result
of the differences in methodology, twelve states received a score of 2 from Campbell,
Jewell, and Lopez but a score of below B- from the Castle Coalition and three states
received a score of 1 from Campbell, Jewell, and Lopez but a grade of B- or above from
the Castle Coalition. Second, the Castle Coalition scored Arizona, Louisiana, Michi-
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empirical test dependent on the overall strength of reform efforts. 46
Moreover, since I was concerned with the overall cost to legislatures
of the reforms, a combined measure was more appropriate than a
series of tests of individual variables measuring particular characteristics of the various state laws.4" Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics for ReformB, as well as for the other variables described below.
gan, Nevada, and South Carolina as having passed effective legislation and Campbell,
Jewell, and Lopez did not, presumably because referenda were involved.
46So few states adopted all three elements (only 5 received a grade of A- or better,
essentially the set of all states adopting effective constitutional amendments addressing both blight and public use, that it was not possible to analyze only those receiving
the highest score due to lack of sufficient variation.
471n three cases, the Castle Coalition grade differed from the effective/ineffective rating assigned by Professor Somin. See Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 2115 (Table 4)
(cited in note 40). The divergent categorization reflected different assessments of the
reforms' provisions (Iowa, Idaho, and South Carolina). I opted to follow the Castle
Coalition grades, largely as a matter of consistency. As a sensitivity check I recoded
Idaho, Iowa, and South Carolina to match Somin's classification and found that this
did not alter the signs or relative magnitudes of the results.
Somin rates Iowa's reform legislation as "ineffective," while the Castle Coalition
gave the state a B+. Somin's critique of the Iowa statute is based on his concern its
blight provisions could be read overly broadly by the courts. See Somin, 93 Minn L
Rev at 2115 (Table 4) (cited in note 40). The Castle Coalition gave more weight to the
improvements in the law, including a requirement of a property-by-property assessment, a restriction on taking of non-blighted properties unless 75% of the other parcels met the definition of blight, and a requirement that the government prove blight
by clear and convincing evidence. Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card at 19 (cited
in note 14). I opted to follow the Castle Coalition grade for Iowa because Somin's criticism seemed too hypothetical to justify deviating from the consistent reliance on the
Castle Coalition grades.
Somin rates Idaho's reform as "effective," while the Castle Coalition gave the state
a D+. The lower Castle Coalition grade reflects a downgrading of the reform legislation for including a provision allowing eminent domain for "those public and private
uses for which eminent domain is expressly provided in the constitution of the State
of Idaho." Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card at 16 (cited in note 14). Because
the Idaho Constitution has only weak restrictions on eminent domain and the Idaho
Supreme Court "has further weakened property rights by adopting an interpretation of
public use that is not tied to-and therefore not restrained by-any traditional understanding," the Castle Coalition report card found this to leave "the door to eminent
domain abuse.., wide open." Id.
Somin rated South Carolina's reforms as "ineffective," while the Castle Coalition
awarded the state a B+. 50 State Report Cardat 44. Somin was concerned that South
Carolina's constitutional amendment left open too many loopholes through vague
or undefined terms, concluding that "[alt best, the amendment modestly increases
the protection provided by current law." See Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 2146 (cited in
note 40). The Castle Coalition, on the other hand, gave South Carolina a B+, concluding that it provided "some of the strongest protection in the country from eminent
domain abuse" because its restrictions on blight were effective at eliminating the ability to use blight designations. The difference ultimately came down to Somin's con-
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Table 3.

Descriptive Statistics

Variable

All
States

48 State
Sample

Description

Dependent variable
ReformB

0.42
(0.499)

0.400
(0.494)

Grade of B- or better on Castle Coalition
Report

Independent variables
RLegP

50.2
(15.1)

RGovP

49.9
(8.45)

49.8
(15.1)

Proportion of legislative seats held by
Republicans (both houses combined) in 2006

50.0
(7.91)

Percent of vote received by Republican
governor in last election

Partial Birth

0.620
(0.490)

0.630
(0.489)

1 if state restricts partial birth abortions,
0 otherwise

ArtsPC

1.08
(0.938)

1.10
(0.947)

Per capita public funding for the arts

EnvScore

45.6
(34.2)

44.73
(34.7)

Combined score of state's U.S. senators in
2005 League of Conservation Voters scorecard

Black

10.4
(9.70)

10.7
(9.72)

Percent of state's population who are AfricanAmerican

Gini

0.446
(0.0213)

0.447
(0.0216)

Gini coefficient for state

TEL

0.58
(0.499)

0.58
(0.498)

1 if state has tax and revenue limit, 0
otherwise

PopChg

20.0
(17.2)

20.2
(17.3)

Percent change in state population 1990-2005

III. THE COSTS OF REFORM
It would be difficult to find other policies of local governments, or even48
state governments, which raised such passionate, uniform feelings.
cern that the amendment itself did not define "public use" to not include economic
development, although current case law in the state held that economic development
was not a public use. See Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 2145-46 (cited in note 40); Castle
Coalition, 50 State Report Card, at 44 (cited in note 14). I opted for the Castle Coalition grade. Somin is surely correct that the South Carolina court could redefine public
use to include economic development but the amendment provides at least as much
protection as legislation defining public use narrowly which also could be changed by
a future decision by a court or the legislature.
48Issues such as abortion provoke passionate views but not uniform ones. Nadler,
Diamond and Patton note that the strength and uniformity of the public reaction to
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Because of the intensity and uniformity of popular feeling against
Kelo-type uses of eminent domain, opposition to anti-Kelo reform
tended not to be openly expressed. 49 Although a few economic development officials and experts, 50 the New York Times5 and Washington Post 2 editorial pages, and some environmental groups defended
the decision, 3 public comment on the decision was overwhelmingly
negative.5 4 The rewards for politicians of passing anti-Kelo reform
legislation were thus immediate and straightforward. After passing
an anti-Kelo reform politicians could report to their constituents that
they had passed a piece of legislation with broad support protecting a
core American value against grasping developers, tyrannical mayors,
or other villains. If legislative success ever is a benefit to a politician's
reelection bid, surely this would be such a case. 5
In contrast, the costs to politicians of eminent domain reform
were long term. Anti-Kelo reforms had important costs for legislators
in six areas. First, by definition substantive reforms limited politicians' ability to use eminent domain in the future. These limits had
variable costs across the states, however, since some states already
constrained their legislatures' ability to spend to a greater degree
than others did. Where spending would more difficult, restrictions
on using the eminent domain power would be more costly.
Second, although popular support for anti-Kelo legislation was
Kelo are atypical of reactions to Supreme Court cases and find that Kelo is the most
unpopular decision of the Rehnquist court. Nadler, Diamond and Patton, Government
Takings of PrivatePropertyat *296 (cited in note 1)
19Defenses of the majority opinion are relatively rare. Most center on arguments
that Kelo is a logical application of existing precedent and a reasonable interpretation of the Constitutional language and seek to shift the discussion away from the
larger questions and focus on the opinion itself. For most of Kelo's defenders, the issue
is not the wisdom of either New London's actions or even economic development
takings more generally but whether the decision was correct as a matter of constitutional law.
s0 See, for example, Perez, 29 W New Eng L Rev 109 (cited in note 21).
s1The Limits of PropertyRights, NY Times (June 24, 2005) online at http://www
.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/opinion/24fril.html. See Matt Welch, Why the New York
Times Vs Eminent Domain, Reason (Oct. 2005) (reporting that the Times benefited
from the use of eminent domain in an economic development project).
12Eminent Latitude,Wash Post, A30(June 24, 2005) online at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/23/AR2005062301698.html (opinion "correct" despite being "quite unjust").
-1 See Ilya Somin and Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development Takings and Environmental Protection,84 Wash U L Rev 623, 626-27 (2006)
(noting defense of Kelo by several environmental groups).
5 See note 20.
ssBut see Somin, Limits, 93 Minn L Rev at 2156 (cited in note 40) (concluding from
polling data that "most Americans are ignorant of the mere existence or lack thereof
of post-Kelo reform in their states, and even fewer can tell whether the reform was
effective or not.")
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bipartisan, interest groups supporting Republicans and Democrats
were affected differently. Giving up eminent domain power was more
costly for environmentalists5 6 and government employees and officials in declining urban areas, both groups that generally support the
Democratic Party over the Republican Party. In addition, protecting
property rights is a more central part of Republican ideology (even if
not practice).57 Restrictions on eminent domain would thus be more
costly to Democrats than to Republicans.5 8
Third, the competitiveness of the political environment in a state
should affect the cost of reform in one of two ways. If legislators want
to lure undecided voters, competition between them could yield
more substantive reform as candidates and parties compete to prove
they are more effective at protecting property rights. Alternatively,
if Republican politicians are not motivated by their ideological position to promote limits on government when they control it (as the
experience of the Republican Congress between 2000 and 2006 suggests is the case for federal level Republican politicians), the higher
the level of general Republican support in the state (making their
seats safer), the less likely Republican legislators will be to adopt
substantive reforms.
Fourth, property rights issues are generally associated with conservative politicians rather than liberal ones. Since both the Democratic
and Republican parties have internal differences over the degree to
At least they appear to have thought so, even if they were incorrect on the merits.
See Somin and Adler, 84 Wash U L Rev 623 (cited in note 53).
"At the very least, we rarely hear Democratic politicians making protection of
property rights an important part of their campaign rhetoric. See Michael J. Gerhardt,
Crisis and Constitutionalism,63 Mont L Rev 277, 291 (2002) (noting that historically
there is a pattern of Democrats (as the party purporting to represent populists and
minorities)" mobilizing against Supreme Court "decisions protecting economic liberties and property rights, while Republicans (as the party purporting to defend majority
and business interests) have tended to mobilize against decisions that favor minorities
or reduced majoritarian power)." Then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi certainly
did not suffer any consequences from opposing efforts to withhold funds from projects using eminent domain by saying "When you withhold funds from enforcing a
decision of the Supreme Court, you are in fact nullifying a decision of the Supreme
Court," terming the efforts "a violation of separation of powers," and claiming that
the Court's decision was "almost as if God has spoken." Mike Allen and Charles
Babington, House Votes to Limit Cities' Use of Eminent Domain, Wash Post (July 1,
2005); David Lightman, Lawmakers Stand Up to Court, Hartford Courant at Al (July 1,

2005).
"' There is some evidence that voting against one's constituents' economic interests can be costly for legislators. See William T. Bogart and Peter Van Doren, Do Legislators Vote Their Constituents' Wallets? (And How Would We Know If They Did?),
60 So Econ J 357,372 (1993) (finding electoral penalty for legislators who voted against
constituents' economic interests but concluding that this effect occurs only when
"the economic effects of policy choices are salient").
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which they are conservative, liberal, focused on economic or social
issues, and so on, the political environment in the states can be measured by comparing legislative actions on non-property rights issues
associated with liberal and conservative positions as well as through
partisan divisions.
Fifth, states differ in their economic climates. Adopting eminent
domain reforms in a growing economy is less costly for a legislature
than doing so in a stagnant or declining one, since the legislators in a
growing economy have greater opportunities for obtaining resources
with which to pursue the public interest or rent-seek without the use
of eminent domain. When the economy is shrinking or stagnant, however, redistributing existing property rights through eminent domain
is more valuable as these alternatives are not as readily available.5 9
Finally, two interest groups have particular interests with respect
to eminent domain that could affect the degree to which substantive reform was possible. African-Americans have a long history of
being the victims of eminent domain and some, but not all, liberal
African-American politicians have been at the forefront of reform
efforts. Adopting substantive reforms should be of greater benefit
for politicians representing a community attuned to the issue and so
less likely to be rationally ignorant of the details of the legislation.
Environmental pressure groups, on the other hand, favor the use of
eminent domain to pursue their own agendas. Legislators in states
with stronger environmental groups should therefore find adopting
substantive reforms more costly. In this section I describe variables
that operationalize these characteristics and which allow testing
hypotheses derived from the brief descriptions above.
There are, of course, other explanations possible for the differences in states' responses to Kelo and the role of costs and benefits
to legislators should not be seen as the only explanation possible.
Even the highest estimate of the variation accounted for by the variables related to the legislative costs and benefits model is that they
explain only 60% or so of the total variation. I cannot test some of the
alternatives because of the lack of data and multiple interpretations
are possible even where we have data consistent with the legislative costs and benefits approach. For example, Professor Somin has
argued that Kelo-style takings do more economic harm than good,
which provides an alternative direction for causation in examining
the relationship between states' economic health and their responses
s11
do not use the Castle Coalition's numbers on reported cases of eminent domain
abuse, see Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain (2003) because the data are
simply those identifiable from news reports and the total for each state "represents
only the tip of the iceberg." Id at 2.
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to Kelo.60 Alternatively, examining the frequency of Kelo-style takings across states would provide another measure of the demand for
reform, but there is 6no consistent measure of such efforts by state and
local governments. 1
A. Resource Constraints
Legislators face binding resource constraints in accomplishing their
goals, whether those goals are publicly spirited or rent-seeking. Fortyfour states require the governor to submit a balanced budget, forty
require the legislature to pass a balanced budget, and thirty-eight forbid the state to carry over a deficit. 62 (Only Vermont does not have at
least one of these fiscal constraints.) In a resource-constrained environment, eminent domain offers government a discount on accomplishing its aims by reducing the transactions costs of projects even
where full compensation is paid and, to the extent it permits undercompensation of property owners, a further discount by lowering the
price of the projects. 63 In some instances, eminent domain allows
state and local governments to obtain resources from the federal government that they would not otherwise receive.64
There is little variation in the existence of a resource constraint
through balanced budget requirements, although they certainly vary
in their effectiveness, but there is considerable variation with respect
limitations (TELs),
to the presence of effective tax and expenditure
6
which exist in only thirty-one states. 1
TELs, particularly now that their spread has slowed, may have
created an important and not easily reversible divide in the
American federal system: between the states that have strong
TELs and those that do not, a divide that may eventually produce large differences in spending and revenue priorities across
66
the states.
60See Ilya Somin, The Case Against Economic Development Takings, 1 NYUJL &
Lib 949 (2005).
61See note 121 and associated text.
62Ronald K. Snell, State Balanced Budged Requirements: Provisionsand Practice
Table 1 (2004), online at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscalibalbuda.htm#tl.
If it was not cheaper to use eminent domain in some circumstances, people
wouldn't use it.
See, example, William A. Fischel, Before Kelo, Regulation 32, 34 (Winter 20052006) online at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv28n4/v28n4-l.pdf (noting
that6 50% or more of the Poletown project was paid by sources other than Detroit).
1 Subo Bae and Thomas Gais, The Effects of State-Level Tax and ExpenditureLimitationson Revenues andExpenditures 5-6 (Rockefeller Institute, May 21, 2007) online
11804
at http://www.rockinst.org/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=
66
Bae and Gais, The Effects of State-Level Tax at 7 (cited in note 65).
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These limitations constrain state spending67 and alter local government expenditure patterns. 68 A legislature operating under an
effective TEL thus faces a constraint on its activities 69 that would
make adopting an effective eminent domain reform more costly than
it would be for a legislature not operating under an effective TEL.
Using data from the Rockefeller Institute's compilation of TELs,7 0 I
created a dummy variable equal to 1 if a state had an effective TEL
and 0 otherwise. This yields:
Hypothesis 1: All else equal, a legislature in a state with an
effective TEL will find substantive reform more costly and so be
less likely to adopt a substantive eminent domain reform.
B. Partisan Politics
Many divisive issues in American politics, such as abortion and
Social Security privatization, involve matters that touch on voters'
deep moral concerns and/or affect vast resources such as the Social
Security trust fund. They also generate significant levels of intensity
67 See,

example, Barry W. Poulson, Tax and Spending Limits: Theory, Analysis,

and Policy, Independence Institute Issue Backgrounder IB-2004-E 1 (2004) online at
http://www.i2i.org/articles/2004-E.pdf ("recent empirical studies support the 'public
choice' view that budget institutions significantly effect fiscal policy. TELs, as well as
other budget rules, can significantly reduce state and local spending."); Bae and Gais,
The Effects of State-Level Tax at 5-6 (cited in note 65) ("state-level TELs significantly
reduce the overall level of state and local spending (when spending is adjusted for
inflation and state population).").
61See, example, Daniel R. Mullins, Tax and Expenditure Limitations and Fiscal
Response of Local Government: Asymmetric Intra-Local FiscalEffects, Public Budgeting & Finance 111 (2004) (examining impact of TELs on local governments); Bae
and Gais, The Effects of State-Level Tax at 6 (cited in note 65).
61Proponents and opponents of TELs agree that they restrict the ability of state
governments to engage in spending. For example, in the 2004 debate over a TEL in
Wisconsin, a proponent argued that a TEL was needed because
[t~he problem is this insatiable appetite to spend. One of the things I have
learned over the years is we are all very adept at protecting our little piece
of the status quo. So, when you say we need to "support the kind of spending we want" or "fund what we think is important"-I can tell you what the
municipalities think is important, I can tell you what the road builders think is
important, I certainly know what the teachers think is important, I know what
my manufacturers think is important. What we get is grief because everybody
gets more spending.
James S. Haney, Comments on Taxpayer Bill of Rights, 88 Marq L Rev 173, 174 (2004).
An opponent, on the other hand, argued that the TEL was "to dramatically reduce the
scope of government" and was "a surface manifestation of more disguised attacks on
public education and all institutions of government." Jack Norman, Is There Really A
Property Tax Crisis? 88 Marq L Rev 161, 172, 162 )2004).
70
Bae and Gais, The Effects of State-Level Tax (cited in note 65).
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on both sides of the issue and are closely tied to partisan divisions:
Democrats tend to be pro-choice and anti-privatization; Republicans
tend to be pro-life and pro-privatization. In contrast, Kelo provoked
bipartisan expressions of outrage and supporters of the initial wave
of anti-Kelo legislation came from both sides of the aisle in most
states." Many commentators noted this strong bipartisan commitment to eminent domain reform. For example, Nadler, Diamond, and
Patton's survey of public opinion polling data on Kelo concluded that
"[p]ublic disapproval of Kelo is notable in its uniformity across traditional political cleavages. The percentage of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents who oppose the Kelo decision is nearly equal
1
in every poll, hovering between 80-85%. 72

However, bipartisan hostility to Kelo among voters is not the
same as bipartisan support for effective reforms. Because of voters'
rational ignorance about the details of the legislative reforms actually enacted, symbolic reforms could satisfy the immediate political
demand for action on eminent domain reform.73 There are several
reasons to theorize that partisan differences with respect to substantive eminent domain reform might exist. First, it fits the pattern of behavior at the federal level. In Congress, both the bipartisanship and reforming zeal on eminent domain dissipated after the
initial rush to condemn the Court's decision. Seventy-nine congress" John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, NY Times, Al
(Feb. 21, 2006) ("'It's open season on eminent domain,' said Larry Morandi, a land-use
specialist at the National Conference of State Legislatures. 'Bills are being pushed by
Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, and they're passing by huge
margins."').
Similarly, at the federal level, post-Kelo support for restrictions on eminent domain
spanned the partisan divide. John Shirey of the California Redevelopment Association, an eminent domain supporter, complained in an interview that
[t]he politics of the situation are remarkable, because we have seen people
from both ends of the political spectrum coming together. We have, on one
hand, Congressman Richard Pombo-who anybody would view as on the far
right-partnering with Congresswoman Maxine Waters-who just about every
political observer would say is on the far left-to co-sponsor legislation that
would all but prohibit the use of eminent domain at the local level if a local
government wants to continue receiving federal funds.
Kelo Backlash Ignores Benefits of Eminent Domain for Redevelopment, The Planning
Report (Dec 2005) online at http://www.planningreport.com/tpr/?module=displaystory
&storyid=l 128 &format=html..
1 Nadler, Diamond and Patton, Government Takings of Private Propertyat *298
(cited in note 1).
13 See Somin, Limits, 93 Minn L Rev at 2169 (cited in note 40) ("it is likely that, to
the extent that interest group opposition was able to stymie effective post-Keloreform
and force the passage of merely cosmetic legislation, this result occurred only because
most ordinary voters are unaware of what is happening. Political ignorance is the
handmaiden of interest group power in the political process, at least in this field.").

Andrew P. Morriss

259

persons cosponsored a symbolic resolution "[e]xpressing the grave
disapproval of the House of Representatives regarding the majority
opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Kelo et a]. v. City of New
London et al. that nullifies the protections afforded private property owners in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment" which
passed by a margin of 365 to 33 (with 18 members voting "present")
on June 30, 2005, just six days after it was introduced and a mere
seven days after the Kelo decision.14 But this overwhelming positive vote concealed some important differences. Of the seventy-nine
cosponsors,"5 only one was a Democrat, thirty-two of the thirty-three
negative votes were by Democrats,7 6 and overall just under 80% of
Republicans in the House voted for the resolution while only slightly
more than 71% of Democrats did so. 71 The same pattern held for the
more substantive H.R. 4128, the Private Property Rights Protection
Act, 78 which passed 376-38 on November 3, 2005: Just nine of the
ninety-eight cosponsors were Democrats and only two of the thirtyeight negative votes were Republicans.7 9 In the Senate, only two
Democrats were among the thirty-two cosponsors to Texas Repub80
lican John Cornyn's 2005 substantive eminent domain legislation.
Finally, when Nevada Republican Sen. John Ensign introduced a
similar measure in the 110th Congress in January 2007, no Democrats (and only three other Republicans) signed on as cosponsors (as
of November 10, 2007). 81 The implication of these voting patterns
is that openly opposing anti-Kelo measures, even purely symbolic
ones like H. Res. 340, was less costly for Democrats than for Republicans.
Second, three of the four state governors who vetoed substantive
anti-Kelo measures were Democrats.12 All three of the Democratic
74

H. Res. 340, 109th Cong. 1st Sess.
1sNote that the House website does not include the bill's sponsor in the total number of cosponsors. I use "cosponsor" in the ordinary meaning of the word and so do
include the sponsor, making my total numbers of cosponsors one greater than the
House's.
16Oddly, the lone Republican "no" vote, Rep. John Hostettler of Indiana, was a
cosponsor.
"Vote data from US Congress Votes Database, online at http://projects.washington
post.com/congress/109/house/l/votes/361/.
"8See Somin, Limits, 93 Minn L Rev at 2149-51 (cited in note 40) (discussing the

substantive provisions of this proposal).

"HR 4178, 109th Cong, 1st Sess.
10S. 1313, 109th Cong, 1st Sess. The two Democrats were California's Barbara Boxer
and Florida's Bill Nelson.

11S. 48 110th Cong, 1st Sess.
12 Arizona's Janet Napolitano, Iowa's Tom Vilsack, New Mexico's Bill Richardson,
Texas' Rick Perry. Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card at 7, 19, 35, 47 (cited in
note 14).
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governors cited opposition to the reforms from local government officials as an important reason for their actions despite overwhelming
support in their respective legislatures83 for the vetoed bills.8 4 Texas'
Gov.Rick Perry had supported the bill there until an amendment
requiring compensation for "diminished access" to property due to
new road or other construction was added.15 Perry's opposition was
'3Arizona's bill passed 45-7 in the state house and 19-8 in the state senate.
(Arizona State Legislature, online at http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp

?inDoc=/legtext/471eg/2r/bills/hb2675o.asp). Iowa's legislature had passed its reform
bill by 43-6 in the Iowa Senate and 89-5 in the Iowa House. Rob Poggenklass, Legislators Ponder Special Session after Governor Vetoes Eminent Domain Bill, West
Branch Times (June 22, 2006) online at http://www.westbranchtimes.com/article
.php?id=995. New Mexico's had passed its bill by 39-0 and 60-0 margins. NM State
Legislature, online at http://legis.state.nm.us/lcs/_session.asp?chamber=H&type=++
&number=746&Submit=Search&year=06. Texas' passed by 125-11 in the state house
(Texas State Legislature, online at http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/hjrnl/80r/pdf/80RDAY85FINAL.PDF#page=45 ) and 29-1 in the state senate (Texas State Legislature, online
at http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/sjrnl/80r/pdf/80RSJ05-22-F.PDF#page=291).
s4See Carrie Watters, Eminent-Domain Bill Vetoed; Too Restrictive, Governor Says, Ariz. Republic (Jun 7, 2006) online at http://www.azcentral.com/arizona
republic/local/articles/0607eminentdomain06O7.html (quoting governor as saying
"said the bill would have created "inappropriate impediments to communities
looking to make their neighborhoods safe and productive. While I oppose the use of
eminent domain power to benefit private economic interests, this bill goes too far
in restricting a city's ability to deal with slums and gangs," she wrote. "It removes
local control, sets up a needlessly complex bureaucratic process for redevelopment
efforts and creates inappropriate impediments to communities looking to make
their neighborhoods safe and productive."); Bill Richardson, Governor's Task Force
Eyes Eminent Domain Abuse, Albuquerque Journal (June 24, 2006) online at http://
www.abqjournal.com/opinion/guest-columns/470895opinion6-24-06.htm ("I was
forced to veto an eminent domain bill after the last legislative session at the urging of cities and towns including Rio Rancho, Alamogordo, Carlsbad, Elida, Elephant
Butte, Truth or Consequences, Tijeras, Pecos and Los Lunas. That bill was hastily
written, overly vague and unfortunately left several loopholes that would have hit
rural communities particularly hard."); Rob Poggenklass, Legislators ponder special
session after governorvetoes eminent domain bill, West Branch Times (June 22,2006)
online at http://www.westbranchtimes.com/article.php?id=995 ("Vilsack said that
HF 2351 would put Iowa at an economic disadvantage with other states. He cited
four projects in particular that could be held up by the new legislation-a plastics
plant in Clinton, an ethanol plant in Dyersville, commercial property in Burlington
and an airport in Pella" and noting that Chambers of Commerce in "many of Iowa's
larger cities" opposed the bill); Gov. Rick Perry, Veto Message for House Bill No. 2006
(June 15, 2007), online at http://www.governor.state.tx.us/divisions/press/bills/vetostatements/message-hb2006 ("Virtually every major city, county and high-growth area
of the state asked me to veto this legislation because of the prohibitively high costs
for future road construction and safety improvements and new schools that would be
caused by these amendments.")
85Van Darden, Texas Farm Bureau Vows to Fight Over Eminent Domain Laws,
Waco Tribune (Dec. 2,2007) online at http://www.wacotrib.com/news/content/news/
stories/2007/12/02/12022007wacFarm.html?cxtype=rss&cxsvc=7&cxcat= 11 (noting
that Perry would sign a bill without that provision).
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thus to a single provision, and one that was relatively unimportant to
the larger issue as it related primarily to the price paid to landowners
when their land was taken for highway construction.
Third, open opposition to post-Kelo limits on eminent domain
came almost entirely from three groups, at least two of which are
traditionally associated with Democrats: environmental pressure

groups;16 local government officials from declining urban areas, 7 and
urban planners. As discussed below, all three groups oppose limitations on local governments' eminent domain powers because they
view those restrictions as preventing their use of eminent domain
to accomplish their goals. Because of the overwhelming popularity
of eminent domain reforms, however, opposition appears to have
largely taken place through discussions with legislators about modifications of bills rather than efforts to win contested votes on the
floor. More members who might be sympathetic to the concerns of
these interest groups would mean it was more likely that reform bills
would shift towards the symbolic through the addition of amendments weakening their protections than that they would be defeated
outright on the floor of the legislature.
Fourth, in recent years protection of property rights has featured
prominently in Republican campaigns; it has been a lesser theme, at
most, in Democratic campaigns. If we take the relative prominence
of property rights protection as a signal of what politicians believe
are issues that will assist their election or reelection, this suggests
that Republican politicians are more likely than Democratic ones to
be concerned with passing substantive reforms. For all these reasons,
it seems likely that the more heavily Republican a state legislature
was, the more likely it was to pass substantive reform. To measure
Republican legislative strength, I used the proportion of Republican
seats in all houses of the state legislature in 2005.8 This yields:
Hypothesis 2: All else equal, the higher percentage of Republicans in the state legislature, the more likely a state is to adopt
substantive eminent domain reforms.
Control of the state legislature is not the only important measure of partisan politics. The competitiveness of the state's political
environment is also important. The political science literature has
86 Somin

and Adler, 84 Wash U L Rev at 626 (cited in note 53) ("environmentalists

have been notably absent among Kelo's critics.").
"See note 118.
"INote that Nebraska has a unicameral legislature. In alternative specifications,
not reported for space reasons, substitution of variables measuring the level of Republican control of a particular house did not generally affect the other results with respect
to sign or significance. Substitution of a dummy variable for Republican majority
control of the legislature also had little impact on the overall results.
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established the importance of the competitiveness of elections as
an important component of a state's political environment. 9 Several
measures of political competitiveness have been proposed by political
scientists: the folded and unfolded Ranney indices,90 a district-level
measure of competitiveness devised by Holbrook and van Dunk,9'
and a similar index (with both folded and unfolded versions) devised
by Brown and Bruce. 92 However, all the published versions of these
measures rely on data from the 1980s and 1990s. Rather than one of
these indices, I used the percentage won by the Republican candidate in the most recent gubernatorial election (either 2004 or 2006).
I chose this measure of competitiveness over the alternative indices
for three theoretical reasons and one practical one.
The first theoretical reason is that there is no consensus in the
literature about which of the multiple political science indices represents the appropriate form for measuring competitiveness at the
state level, with disagreement over a variety of issues. 93 There is thus

s9Thomas M. Holbrook and Emily van Dunk, Electoral Competitionin the American States, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev 955 (1993) (summarizing literature). Competitiveness
has generally been associated with greater political liberalism based on two related
assumptions: "First, elected officials in competitive areas will be highly responsive to
constituency needs, due to the risk of electoral defeat. Second, due to higher overall
levels of voter participation in competitive environments, lower socioeconomic class
interests will constitute a greater share of the electorate in competitive states than in
non-competitive states." Holbrook and van Dunk, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev at 955.
"The folded Ranney index is based on the proportion of seats won by Democrats
in the state legislature, the Democratic vote in the last gubernatorial election, and the
percentage of time the governorship and legislature are controlled by the Democratic
party. The factors are averaged and an index constructed between 0 (complete Republican domination) to 1 (complete Democratic control). The index is then "folded"
to create an index between 0.5 and 1, with 0.5 a perfectly competitive political environment and 1 a single party-dominated environment. Holbrook and van Dunk, at
955-56.
91This measure combines the percentage of the popular vote won by the winning
candidate in state legislative elections, the margin of victory, whether the seat is a
"safe" seat (with a party receiving 55% or more), and whether the seat was contested
or not. Holbrook and van Dunk 87 Am Pol Sci Rev at 956.
92Robert D. Brown and John M. Bruce, Political Parties in State and Nation: Party
Advantage and Party Competition in a Federal Setting, 8 Party Politics 635 (2002).
Brown and Bruce calculate their index based on the margin of victory in the state
House, state Senate, governor, US House, US Senate, and presidential races in an
eight year period. These individual scores are then aggregated to the state level. Id at
642-43.
93For example, the Ranney indices focus on outcomes ( partisan control of government), while the Holbrook and van Dunk and Brown and Bruce indices measure the
margin of victory in electoral contests; the Holbrook and van Dunk index differs from
the Brown and Bruce index in its inclusion of uncontested seats and exclusion of
gubernatorial races.
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no reason to favor a particular form of index as a general matter. The

second theoretical reason is that, for the purposes of this Article,
the need is for a measure of state-level political competitiveness independent of the direction of partisan control of the legislature itself
(which is measured by another variable). The Republican candidate's
percentage of the gubernatorial vote provides a state-level measure
of overall competitiveness of the environment in which individual
legislators must run for reelection. This captures both the direction
of the state's political leanings (which would not be captured by a
folded index) and the overall competitiveness of the state political
environment. 94 In contrast, all three of the political science indices
include measures of the degree of Republican success in legislative
elections as well, which would introduce potential multicollinearity
with the variable measuring the degree of Republican support in the
two houses of the legislature.
This variable allows testing of two alternative hypotheses about
the political environment. 95 An unfolded variable based on levels of
Republican support whose value would test whether, holding the level
of Republican support in the state legislature constant, an increasing level of statewide-support for Republicans-making Republican
seats "safer"-increased (a positive coefficient) or decreased (a negative coefficient) support for substantive reform. Increased support
would be consistent with legislators following their constituents'
interests (a public interest model), while decreased support would
be consistent with legislators with "safer" seats being less inclined
to adopt a reform which was costly to them (a public choice model).
These yield:
94

There are idiosyncratic elements to gubernatorial contests, of course. But the
margin in the gubernatorial contest appears more likely to measure state trends than
the margin in the 2004 Presidential contest or in other federal races. Since those are
included in the Brown and Bruce index, that appears to dilute the measure of state
competitiveness important here. Using a folded version of the same variable-i.e. the
wining candidate's margin-offers a means of testing whether it is the closeness of
state's partisan divide that matters or whether it is the partisan direction of the environment that matters.
95A directionless, folded variable would be negative and significant if states
which are closely divided (as signified by smaller values) were more likely to adopt
a substantive reform. This would occur if there was a group of voters both capable
of distinguishing between symbolic and substantive reforms and motivated to vote
based on property rights issues. In a closely divided state, both parties would presumably compete for this group's support by adopting substantive reforms. See, example,
Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in Political Environmentalism
263, 283-85 (Terry L. Anderson, ed, 2000) (describing how competition between Pres.
Richard Nixon and Sen. Edmund Muskie (the favorite for the Democratic presidential
nomination in 1972) led to a more intrusive Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.
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Hypothesis 3a: Legislators in a state with a higher degree of
general support for Republicans will find adoption of substantive eminent domain reform less costly and more rewarding.
Hypothesis 3b: Legislators in a state with a more competitive
political environment will find adoption of substantive eminent domain reform less costly and more rewarding.
C. Issue Politics
American politics are often portrayed on a single dimension, liberalconservative scale. Although this understates the complexity of
American politics (many social liberals are economic populists; some
economic populists prefer conservative social policies, etc.), there are
issues that disaggregate some of these strains in American politics in
ways that can shed light on the eminent domain reform legislation.
Whether a state has restrictions on partial birth abortion (31 states
do)96 is a proxy for social conservative strength; per capita public
funding for the arts is a proxy for social liberal strength (the mean is
$1.08 but the minimum is $0.06 and the maximum is $5.36). While
public opinion polling found no divide between conservatives and
liberal voters with respect to support for eminent domain reform and
neither abortion or arts funding are issues related to property rights
for most voters, these are reasonable proxies for social conservative
and liberal strength in a state. Given the distinctions exemplified by
the difference between Republicans in Rhode Island (e.g. Sen. Lincoln Chafee, who received a 41, the lowest score of any Republican,
on the National Journal's conservative composite score) and South
Carolina (e.g. Sen. Jim DeMint, who received a 92.5, the highest of
any Republican), 97 measures of conservative and liberal strength
more completely characterize states' political environments than do
simple measures of partisan strength.98 This yields:
16Abortion

data are taken from Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief (2007)

online at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_-OAL.pdf. Although the
Institute is affiliated with Planned Parenthood, and so not neutral in the abortion
debate, its factual materials are reliable. Note that states were coded as having such a
ban even if it had been permanently enjoined since the relevant fact was that the ban
had been passed, not whether or not it was in effect.
97

The National Journal scores are available at http://nationaljoumal.com/vote

ratings/sen/cons.htm. South Carolina's other Republican senator, Lindsey Graham,
received a 70.8 score, giving the state an average senatorial score of almost twice that

of Rhode Island's lone Republican senator.
91 use national figures like Chafee and DeMint for expository purposes here because the equivalent state figures are less likely to be recognized by out-of-state readers. For a discussion of the political science literature's methods for characterizing
state ideology see Marshall H. Medoff, The PoliticalImplications of State Political

Ideology: A Measure Tested, 56 Am J Econ & Soc 145 (1997).
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Hypothesis 4: More conservative states will be more likely to
adopt substantive reform; more liberal states less so.
The only large interest groups whose representatives publicly suggested sympathy for the Kelo majority's opinion are environmental
pressure groups.9 9 This "green defense," likely a mistaken one on the
merits,100 is tied to two perceived interests of environmental pressure groups. First, they want broad eminent domain powers available
to lower the cost of projects they support, ranging from infrastructure such as mass transit (a more traditional subject for eminent
domain) to redevelopment of brownfields. Second, environmental
pressure groups appear to fear the use of the anti-Kelo backlash as a
weapon against other policies they favor (land use controls, regulatory takings generally) and so sought to limit its impact. To capture
the strength of a state's environmental interest group community, I
used the combined scores of the state's U.S. Senators on the League
of Conservation Voters' Environmental Scorecard. Since U.S. Senators run statewide, this provides a reasonable measure of the degree
to which elected officials in the state find it worthwhile to curry
favor with voters for whom environmental pressure groups' views
are important.' 0' This yields:

99See Somin and Adler, 84 Wash U L Rev at 304-305 (cited in note 53). John Echeverria,
the executive director of the Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute has
offered the most comprehensive green defense of Kelo. Echeverria, Testimony,online at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/news/documents/NewYorkTestimonyNovem
ber2005.pdf. He made two claims in support: First, Kelo was correctly decided and is
actually a narrower reading of the eminent domain power than prior eminent domain
cases; and second, eminent domain is "an essential government power" and is particular important in preventing hold outs from stopping projects that deter sprawl,
including mass transit and brownfield development. Further, Echeverria has argued
that the anti-Kelo popular response does not indicate a lessening of popular sympathy
for regulatory takings in land use control, and in fact indicates broad public support
for "strong community protections." Id. (This point is supported by Nadler, Diamond
and Patton, Government Takings of Private Propertyat *22-23 (cited in note 1) (suggesting more thorough reading of poll results showed continued support for some eminent domain uses.) Even this defense is qualified, however, by support for additional
procedural steps to "weed out" inappropriate uses of eminent domain and "modest"
additional compensation for residential property owners and tenants, although both
of these types of reforms could be applied to focus eminent domain efforts on projects
environmental pressure groups prefer.
100See Somin and Adler, 84 Wash U L Rev at 666 (cited at note 53) ("Economic
development takings pose a significant threat to environmental quality, while providing few if any environmental benefits.").
"1There are issues concerning whether the LCV Scorecard is accurate. See, for
example, National Center for Policy Analysis, League of ConservationVoters Makes
Traditional Misleading Attack on Republicans, Promotes Democratic Party Candidates, (Oct. 30, 2002) online at http://www.nationalcenter.org/TSR103002.html.
What matters for the purposes of this Article is not whether the scorecard accurately
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Hypothesis 5: States with stronger political support for measures approved of by environmental pressure groups will be less
likely to adopt substantive reforms.
D. Economic Development
Eminent domain for economic development is not a phenomenon
of governments in growing regions; it is primarily used in stagnant
and declining cities like Detroit, Lakewood, Ohio and New London,
Connecticut) °0 As the majority in Kelo noted, the city of New London had an unemployment rate "nearly double" that of Connecticut
and its population was at its lowest level since 1920.103 Lakewood,
Ohio, a Cleveland suburb, "has fallen victim to many of the ailments
that plagued Cleveland in previous decades, suffering from 'an outdated infrastructure, an aging housing stock, decreas[ed] commercial
investment and an eroding tax base."' 1°4 As the tax base declines in
such cities their politicians are reduced to dividing a shrinking pie
and eminent domain becomes more attractive to them as a means of

doing so.10s
This is true regardless of whether one takes a public interest or
a public choice view of economic development projects. Eminent
domain abuse can occur even as part of well-intentioned economic
development efforts. Government officials may take property from
individual owners and transfer it to a favored developer in hopes of
sparking economic development (e.g. the Lakewood, Ohio plan and
Detroit's Poletown). At best, such efforts benefit the majority at the
expense of a minority;106 at worst, favored interests are rewarded at
measures important votes on the environment but whether it accurately measures
fidelity to the agenda of environmental organizations likely to oppose eminent domain
reforms. The criticisms do not detract from this function.
"2See Dick M. Carpenter II and John K. Ross, Victimizing the Vulnerable: The
Demographics of Eminent Domain Abuse (Institute for Justice, June 2007) (finding
that eminent domain abuse occurs most often in areas with low income and minority
residents).
t0
1 Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655, 2658.
101Salkin and Lucero, 37 Urb Law at 218 (cited at note 34) (quoting Don lannone,
Lakewood, Ohio: Struggle to Get Land for Development, Econ Dev Futures Web
J, (Oct. 20, 2003), online at http://www.don-iannone.com/edfutures/2003-10-19
ed-futuresarchive.html).
10sOf 258 American cities ranked by CityMayors, the population in forty declined
by more than 2% from 2000 to 2006, falling between 0.1% and 2% in another 25.
Twenty-four more grew by less than 1%. In contrast, 65 American cities grew by 10%
or more in that same period, 27 of which grew by more than 20% and 17 of which grew
by more than 30%. See CityMayors, The Fastest Growing American Cities, online at
http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/us-cities-growth-2007.html.
1°6Since minority objects, it is being paid less than its subjective value for the
property and so receiving less than full compensation. Third, the eminent domain
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the expense of both the majority (who derive no benefit from plans
that fail but bear the costs of the compensation for the takings) and
the dispossessed owners. In either case, the rewards for the economic development efforts accrue to the officials promoting the economic development scheme. They either reap the political benefit
of a successful development (a public interest explanation) or benefit from transferring resources to favored interests (a public choice
explanation).
The economic development projects that require eminent domain
offer the chance to increase tax revenues (whether this potential is
often fulfilled is a separate question.) 07 In particular, declining regions adjacent to greenbelt development have difficulty competing
for tax revenue-generating sources. For example, in defending a controversial eminent domain project (later defeated) in Lakewood, Ohio
in 2003, Bruce Katz of the Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy
at the Brookings Institution called eminent domain "a critical tool
for cities that are depopulated. It is a way for them to protect the interests of all the citizens in a community by ensuring that the future
tax base is secure." 08 Declining urban area politicians' interest lies
in minimizing the constraints on their ability to use their eminent
domain powers. Because these politicians have ready access to legislators, we should expect their opposition to high profile, popular
legislation like the post-Kelo eminent domain reforms to be conducted through changes to the legislation rather than through overt
opposition. This appears to have occurred in at least some cases.
Pennsylvania's eminent domain reform banned its use for economic
development and limited the definition of blight but exempted areas
previously designated as blighted in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and
Delaware County for seven years. 0 9
As a result, the value of eminent domain powers to politicians
should be less in economically growing regions than it would be in

process may result in under-compensation of property owners because the process
fails to correctly value the property which is taken. There are a variety of reasons why
under-compensation might systematically occur. Richard Epstein catalogues a range
of "systematic and institutional biases" for under-compensation, including governments' ability to reduce property values in advance of takings through infrastructure
decisions. Epstein, Originalat 360 (cited in note 6).
107 See, example, Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 194-201 (cited in note 23) (discussing
with economic development arguments for takings).
problems
108
Blaine Harden, In Ohio, A Defensefor Eminent Domain, Wash Post (June 25, 2003)
online at http://www.bbertymatters.org/newsservice/2003/faxback/06-25-03-2504Ohio.htm.
1 See 26 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 203(b)(3), (4), (5) (exempting certain areas from stricter
standards until 2012). See also Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card at 42 (cited in
14) (discussing exemptions).
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economically declining areas. 10 To distinguish growing from declining states, I calculated the percent change in population from 1990 to
2005."' Politicians in states whose economies are growing should be
more willing to yield eminent domain powers in substantive reforms
because those powers have less value to them than eminent domain
powers do in states with a declining economy. This yields:
Hypothesis 6: States whose economies and populations are
growing will be more likely to adopt substantive eminent
domain reforms than states whose economies and populations
are stagnating or declining.
One important caveat bears mention here. As noted earlier, there
is evidence that eminent domain is an ineffective tool for economic
development." 2 Causation between economic decline and reform
may thus run in either or both directions: states may be more economically successful to the extent that they avoid Kelo-style takings and so growing states may be more likely to adopt substantive
reforms and to avoid the takings in the first place because their state
and local officials have figured this out. My data does not allow
untangling these alternative (and to some extent, complementary)
explanations.
E. Oppressing Vulnerable Groups
Although many of the high profile eminent domain cases involve
governments taking the homes of middle class people like Suzette
Kelo or the Lakewood, Ohio homeowners, the history of eminent
domain's use is replete with instances in which it was used primarily
against politically vulnerable groups. For example, there is evidence
of this in the urban redevelopment schemes and interstate highway routing decisions in the 1950s and 1960s" 3 and Justice Thomas
noted in his dissent in Kelo that because urban renewal projects in
the 1950s and 1960s so often displaced nonwhite and low-income
" 0 It would be convenient to have a consistent measure of eminent domain's use
across states. Unfortunately, no such measure exists.
II I chose this period for two reasons. First, the period needed to be long enough
to distinguish consistent growth from random noise. Second, it needed to be short
enough to avoid having recent trends swamped by historical patterns that no longer
were likely to be valid predictors. I experimented with a range of different periods and
found no major changes in results.
2
" See Somin, 1 NYUJL & Lib 949 (cited in note 60).
3
" Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 120 (cited in note 4) ("Takers may be least concerned with avoiding the subjective losses of those political outsiders, including racial
minorities and the poor, who are not attached to cohesive communities.").
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neighborhoods urban removal became known as "Negro removal. "" 4
Minority communities' accurate perception that they are vulnerable
to eminent domain abuse has led to some high-profile opposition to
the practice by Rep. Maxine Waters (D. Cal.),"' one of the most liberal
members of Congress' 6 and an African-American, and the filing of an
amicus in support of the property owners by the NAACP in Kelo." 7
On the other hand, as noted earlier, ten of the thirty-seven members
of the Congressional Black Caucus who voted on the symbolic H.
Res. 340 voted against it, including such leading African-American
politicians as Rep. Jesse L. Jackson, Jr., Rep. Alcee Hastings, and Rep.
Stephanie Tubbs-Jones. And large African-American populations in
declining urban areas means that larger African-American populations are correlated with politicians"' who would be likely to oppose
substantive reforms as limits on their own powers.'' 9
If the historical experience of "Negro removal" dominated in
" 4 Kelo, 125 S Ct 2655, 2687 (Thomas dissenting) (quoting Pritchett, The "Public
Menace '"of Blight: Urban Renewal and the PrivateUses of Eminent Domain, 21 Yale
L & Pol'y Rev 1, 47 (2003)).
l15Although Rep. Waters was a vocal opponent of Kelo, she did not cosponsor or
vote on H Res 340. However, she did cosponsor and vote for H R 4128.
16Rep. Waters, who National Review termed "the famously fire-breathing leftwing congresswoman from Los Angeles," (Rich Lowry, "Mad Max" Stands with the
Right, Nat'l Rev Online, (Aug. 5, 2005), online at http://www.nationalreview.com/
lowry/lowry200508050737.asp), tied for 29th most liberal on the National Journal's
2006 composite score and tied for 20th on the social liberalism subscore, making her
more liberal than 91.2% of Congress generally and more than 95% of Congress on
social issues. National Review, 2007 Vote Ratings, online at http://nationaljournal
.com/voteratings/house/lib.htm?ol =lib.social&o2=desc#vr.
"'Brief of Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, AARP, Hispanic Alliance of Atlantic County, Inc., Citizens in Action, Cramer
Hill Resident Association, Inc., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
in Support of Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, No 04-108 (filed Dec 3, 2004)
(available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 2811057. However, many prominent AfricanAmerican politicians opposed HR 340, including Reps. Jesse Jackson Jr., Stephanie
Tubbs-Jones, and Alcee Hastings. The Congressional Black Caucus split 27-10 (with 2
members not voting and one voting "present") on H Res 340, a much closer split than
the House as a whole or the Democratic minority. On H R 4198, a more substantive
measure, 27 members of the CBC voted for it and six voted against it. Although CBC
support for HR 4198 was greater, the proportion of CBC members voting no was still
higher than the proportion of Democrats (36 of 193 voting) or members generally (38
of 414 voting).
"I The mayors of six of the ten cities experiencing the largest declines in population
from 2000-2006 are African Americans, for example. At the time of this writing, New
Orleans (1), Detroit (2), Cleveland (3), Dayton (6), Buffalo (7), and Birmingham (8) all
have African-American mayors.
"9See generally Johnnie Dee Swain, Jr., Black Mayors: Urban Decline and the
Underclass, 24 J Black Stud 16 (1993) (discussing role of African American mayors in
declining urban areas).

270

Symbol or Substance?

the African American community, then states with larger AfricanAmerican populations to be more likely to adopt substantive reforms
than those with smaller African-American populations because politicians representing those constituents would be more likely to seek
to protect their constituents with real reforms.120
States vary a great deal in their use of eminent domain for economic development purposes and it would be ideal to have a variable
that measured the differences across states. The only potential source
of such data is the Castle Coalition's report, Public Power, Private
Gain, which includes data by state on condemnations between 1998
and 2003. Unfortunately, the data has major gaps. As the report
itself notes, only twenty-four states collect comprehensive eminent
domain data and there are comparability issues with the data that is
collected.121
An alternative measure of vulnerability to eminent domain abuse
is the state's Gini coefficient, the standard economic measure of
inequality. A state with a higher Gini coefficient has a greater degree
of income inequality, and so a segment of the population more politically vulnerable to having its property redistributed by political leaders.122 If eminent domain is particularly valuable where there is a vulnerable population, eminent domain powers would be more valuable
in a more "target rich" environment and a higher Gini coefficient
should make adopting reforms more costly. This yields:
Hypothesis 7: States with larger African American and economically vulnerable populations will be more likely to adopt
substantive eminent domain reforms than states with smaller
African American and economically vulnerable populations.
IV.

RESULTS

Using the variables described above,12 I tested the seven hypotheses
set out in the previous section using logistic regression analysis.
120In short, the history of abuse targeting African Americans might have been sufficient to overcome those voters' rational ignorance. Because eminent domain's history
of abuse seems to have been primarily used against African-Americans, rather than
racial minorities generally, I focused on this sub-population. Although some Hispanic
organizations joined in the anti-Kelo movement, no Hispanic politicians emerged as
leaders of reform of the same degree of prominence as Rep. Waters.
121See Berliner, Public Power,PrivateGain at 2, 8 (cited in note 59). See also Somin,
Limits, 93 Minn L Rev at 2116 (cited in note 40) (discussing limitations on this data,
although concluding it could be used for different purposes).
,22The Gini coefficient is higher when there are more retired people, all else equal,
which could mask an association with poverty. I also explored other measures of poverty, which were not significant.
" As a check on multicollinearity among the dependent variables described above,
I examined bivariate correlation matrices for all the independent variables. Although
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The results are presented in Table 4. Note that the coefficients in
logit regressions lack the natural interpretation of the coefficients
in ordinary least squares regressions. The table presents the coefficients, while the discussion of the results includes comparisons
of the impact of changes in the relevant variables on the odds of a
substantive reform being adopted. 124
Interpreting these results allows the following evaluation of the

hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: All else equal, a legislature in a state with an
effective TEL will find substantive reform more costly and so be
less likely to adopt a substantive eminent domain reform.
The regression results strongly support this hypothesis. The coefficient on TEL was significant and negative in every specification and
the presence of an effective TEL reduced the odds of a state adopting
a substantive reform from 0.66 to between 0.026 to 0.054, depending
on the specification. These strong results also support the overall
argument of this Article that the appropriate focus is on the interests
of the politicians voting on the reforms.
Hypothesis 2: All else equal, the higher percentage of Republicans in the state legislature, the more likely a state is to adopt
substantive eminent domain reforms.
The results also strongly support this hypothesis. As Republican legislative strength increases, adoption of substantive reforms
become more likely. The coefficients were positive and significant at
the 5% level or better in every specification but one.' 2 To double the
there is no firm rule regarding what level of correlation indicates potential problems,
only two variable pairs exceeded the most conservative cutoff: the percentage of
African-Americans and the Gini coefficient (a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.543)
and the percentage of Republicans in the legislature and the environmental voting
score of the state's U.S. Senators (-0.528). Both were well below the level of concern
used in many studies and, since three of the four variables involved proved resolutely
insignificant, it does not appear that multicollinearity is a problem. Gregory C. Sisk,
Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss, Chartingthe Influences on the JudicialMind:
An EmpiricalStudy of JudicialReasoning, 73 NYU L Rev 1377, 1432-33 n 233 (1998)
(discussing issue in detail).
'14 The odds multiplier approach to interpreting logistic regression results is discussed in detail in Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 73 NYU L Rev at 1457-58 n 291 (cited
in 123). Briefly, one starts with the odds of an outcome (for example, in the case of
the TEL coefficient, 0.395/0.604 = 0.655), then calculates the odds multiplier of the
logistic regression coefficient by taking the antilog of the coefficient (e.g. exp(-3.25) =
0.039 for specification (1) and the TEL coefficient), and then multiplying the result by
the initial odds ratio to produce the new odds ratio (0.656 * 0.039 = 0.0256).
' Even there the sign was correct and the coefficient only narrowly missed the 5 %
level (the significance level was 6.3%). Given the small number of observations, and
the large number of variables included in specification (3), this is unsurprising.
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odds of a substantive reform's passage would require between an 8%
and 14% increase in Republican support in the legislature, depending on the specification. 126 Note that these results are not support
for a greater degree of devotion to principle or public-mindedness
among Republican legislators. Rather it is simply evidence that in
this instance the net benefits to legislators of supporting substantive eminent domain reforms were greater for Republicans than for
Democrats. These results do not distinguish among the potential
explanations for why this was so. It thus could be that Republicans
have a greater, principled attachment to property rights but it could
also be that Republicans are less responsive to the needs of politicians
in declining urban areas or other pro-eminent domain/economic
development interest groups than Democrats purely for pragmatic
or venal reasons.
Hypothesis 3a: Legislators in a state with a higher degree of
general support for Republicans will find adoption of substantive eminent domain reform less costly and more rewarding.
Hypothesis 3b: Legislators in a state with a more competitive
political environment will find adoption of substantive eminent domain reform less costly and more rewarding.
Republican strength in the most recent statewide gubernatorial
race was significantly and negatively correlated with passage of a
substantive reform, suggesting that the Republican commitment to
property rights is less deep than party rhetoric might suggest when
it comes to limiting their own power. A roughly 5 % increase halved
the odds ratio of adopting a substantive reform. While theory had
provided two alternative hypotheses on the impact of states' political
competitiveness, the results were consistent only with one (hypothesis 3b). If the obstacle to adopting substantive reforms over symbolic
ones (or inaction) was the influence of the Democratic-leaning interest groups identified earlier within the legislature (persuading committee chairs to modify legislation to create exceptions, for example),
then a measure of overall Republican strength, like the party's percentage in the last gubernatorial race would be significant and positive. If greater overall Republican strength led to a lessening of the
likelihood of a substantive reform, this would suggest that greater
security for Republican legislators would decrease their willingness
26

1 On estimating increased odds for continuous variables, see David W. Hosmer

and Stanley Lemeshow, Applied Logistic Regression 63-64 (2d ed 2000).
'" Alternatively, if a folded variable measuring the winner's percentage in the most
recent governor's race would be negative and significant this would be evidence that
states with more competitive environments were more likely to enact substantive
reforms, as politicians competed to win voter favor by doing so. Folded versions of this
variable were insignificant when tried.
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to adopt a substantive reform that restricted their future actions. 127
Taken together with the prior results on the degree of Republican
support in the legislature, this is some evidence that it is not principle that motivates Republican legislators to be more supportive of
substantive eminent domain reforms.
Hypothesis 4: More conservative states will be more likely to
adopt substantive reforms; more liberal states less so.
Hypothesis 5: States with stronger political support for measures approved of by environmental pressure groups will be less
likely to adopt substantive reforms.
The data provided no evidence that conservative, liberal, or green
political cultures, at least as measured here, are associated with either
greater or lesser likelihood of substantive reform. This result likely
reflects two important features of the post-Kelo political landscape.
First, outrage over the decision among voters was high among all
political groups. There was no mass movement defending Kelo-style
eminent domain, only efforts by affected interest group leaders to
water down reforms. Given this uniform distaste for Kelo, it is not
too surprising that variables measuring other political trends were
uncorrelated with the outcome. Second, the differences between
a substantive reform and a symbolic one lay in details not readily
understandable by voters. Given rational ignorance, it is not surprising that the differences in outcomes were not associated with broader
political trends. Indeed, the lack of significance for these variables
tends to confirm that a model focused on the costs and benefits to
legislators is the appropriate model.
The lack of a significant coefficient is not conclusive proof of the
absence of an impact. However, the lack of significance for the measure of environmental group strength is noteworthy for two reasons.
First, the variable was based on states' U.S. Senators' votes on the
League of Conservation Voters Scorecard. That scorecard includes
votes on precisely the sort of procedural votes and amendments that
would be associated with weakening an eminent domain reform. If
green pressure groups were behind the effective opposition to substantive eminent domain reform, this was a variable well-positioned to
capture their behavior since it measured senators' willingness to vote
on similar types of provisions in Congress. Given that it was resolutely
insignificant in all specifications, this suggests that the effective opposition to eminent domain reform likely came from elsewhere.
Hypothesis 6: States whose economies and populations are
growing will be more likely to adopt substantive eminent
domain reforms than states whose economies and populations
are stagnating or declining.
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States with growing economies, as measured by population growth,
were much more likely to adopt substantive reforms. Growth one
standard deviation above the mean increases the odds of adopting a
substantive reform between 2.24 and 3 times, depending on the specification. This helps answer the puzzle noted by some commentators
that states experiencing the most eminent domain abuse were not
the most likely to adopt reforms and that states that had not experienced significant abuse did adopt reforms. 121 In a public interest
model, the cost of a reform in a growing economy was smaller than
in a stagnating or declining one as eminent domain is not needed to
accomplish economic development. In a public choice model, state
and local governments have much less clumsy ways to redistribute
wealth in a growing economy, ranging from tax abatements to state
contracts. In either case, the results here suggest that growing states'
legislators found substantive reforms less costly than legislators in
declining and stagnating states.
As noted earlier, there is an alternative explanation consistent
with this data. If economic development takings are simply rentseeking and not only do not produce economic development but
inhibit economic growth (which is particularly likely if they are
adopted more often in states that make other economic policy mistakes), causation may run in the other direction (or, perhaps, in both
directions). Unfortunately, the data do not permit a test of which of
these explanations is correct.
Hypothesis 7: States with larger African American and economically vulnerable populations will be more likely to adopt
substantive eminent domain reforms than states with smaller
African American and economically vulnerable populations.
Both the percentage of African Americans and the states' Gini coefficients proved resolutely insignificant, suggesting that the historical association of eminent domain with "Negro removal" programs
was insufficient to raise the costs of opposing reforms for politicians
sensitive to the concerns of African American or poorer communities
within states. There are two plausible explanations for this pattern.
First, despite the historical use of eminent domain in urban renewal
projects that targeted minorities and the poor, eminent domain abuse
today is news precisely because it has been expanded to be used
against working and middle class property owners, as in Kelo and the
11 See Somin, Limits, 93 Minn L Rev at 2105 (cited in note 40) (noting that several
effective reforms "were enacted by states that had little or no history of condemning
property for economic development. Only seven states that had previously engaged
in significant numbers of economic development and blight condemnations have
enacted post-Kelo legislative reforms with any real teeth.").
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Lakewood projects. As Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent, what
was so shocking to Americans was that "[nlothing is to prevent the
any home with
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton,
29
a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory."'1
Second, a key interest group involved in defending eminent domain
powers are local government officials within declining urban areas.
These officials are often African American politicians (e.g. former
Detroit Mayor Coleman Young, a key backer of the infamous Poletown project in Detroit). 30 A larger African American presence in a
state means that there is also likely a larger percentage of African
American politicians in the legislature with ties to these local officials. And the African-American political leadership was fragmented
as shown by the divisions in the Congressional Black Caucus over
the symbolic H.Res. 340. The lack of significance for these variables
suggests that any political support for eminent domain reform based
on the historical experience of the community is offset by the current
interests of the politicians representing those communities.
V. CONCLUSION
The results of this analysis are consistent with several of the themes
in the post-Kelo commentary critical of the decision. Many commentators on Kelo found the majority's high degree of deference to local
governments, "supine deference" in Professor Ely's view,'3 ' troublesome. As Professor Epstein summarized, Kelo "distorts the operation
of public processes by giving state legislators, and the people who
lobby them, too many degrees of freedom to engage in public mischief."132 If the political process is dependent on the costs and benefits
to legislators, as this analysis suggests it is with respect to eminent
domain reform, it is unlikely that exercise of eminent domain powers
will be checked by the political process. Given the strong correlation
between economic growth and substantive eminent domain reform
measures, it is especially unlikely that reforms will occur where they
are most needed: in areas where eminent domain is most attractive
to politicians. This is particularly true because of the combination
of rational ignorance on the issue documented by Professor Somin33
and the high costs of maintaining the coalition seeking reform.
If, as the response to Kelo suggests, the rules of eminent domain are
129125 S
3

Ct at 2676 (O.Connor, J., dissenting).

' °Fischel, Before Kelo, Regulation at 34 (cited in note 64) (Young's "eagerness" for
the Poletown development "as surely a necessary condition" for the project).
131Ely, 20 Prob & Prop at 14 (cited in note 4).
132Epstein, The Public Use at 126 (cited in note 7).
'3

See note 37.

Andrew P. Morriss

277

set through a political process unresponsive to voter interests due
to rational ignorance and whose outcome is determined by legislators' own interests, even at a time of heightened scrutiny due to the
"perfect storm"'3 4 that followed the Kelo opinion, there is little hope
that a process designed by state legislators will be sufficient to control eminent domain abuses in a great many cases. Effective reform
requires finding constraints that do not depend on the responsiveness of politicians. This emphasizes the importance of constitutional
reforms that effectively limit the types of eminent domain power
most susceptible to abuse, the crucial role of citizen groups in seeking such reforms, and the courts in implementing them. 35 Together
with Professor Somin's finding that citizen-initiated referenda produced more substantive reforms, the results here counsel against
reliance on legislatures for protection. Of course, reforms will not
halt all economic development projects even if they are effective at
stopping eminent domain abuse. But by putting such projects more
fully "on budget," they will force legislatures to face opportunity
costs and so be likely to prevent those projects that impose net social
36
welfare losses. 1
Professor Gillette offers one of the few defenses of Kelo on the merits. He argues that the majority correctly removes the courts from
review where courts are unable to do better than the political process: "so much of the language of the decision implies that, given the
process utilized in Kelo, the Court could not identify any apparent
political process failure that courts could detect and correct better
than the political process itself." 13 His
claim is only that the capacity of the judiciary to make inquiries
into the process, to reverse engineer the political decision to
determine whether it was tainted or whether the same decision would have been reached on objective grounds, is minimal.
Thus, perhaps the best that a court can do is to define the conditions under which the probability of abuse is minimal and defer
to the political process when those criteria are satisfied.'38
3 Nadler, Diamond and Patton, Government Takings of Private Propertyat *305
(cited
in note 1).
35
1 See William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin an
Interest Group Perspective,18 J L & Econ 875 (1975).
,36 See Andrew P. Morriss and Richard L. Stroup, QuarteringSpecies: The "Living
Constitution," the Third Amendment, and the EndangeredSpecies Act, 30 Envtl L
769, 807 (2000) (arguing that placing government programs like the Endangered Species Act "'on budget' would force" resource allocation choices "into the open" and
"provide common measures of effectiveness ... with which to evaluate results.")
131Gillette, 34 Hofstra L Rev at 16 (cited in note 25).
3
1 1 Id at 20.
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In Kelo, the existence of the larger development plan met this condition. 3 9 But reliance on the political process is likely to be effective
only where politicians face binding constraints on their exercise of
the takings power. The Kelo majority's reliance on politics to check
takings is thus likely at least partially misplaced.
Kelo's critics argued that courts can play an important role in
evaluating public use claims and checking legislative abuses. As Professor Epstein noted, "there would be no reason to have any takings
protection at all if governments routinely satisfied two key conditions. First, they only acted in the interests of the entire public every
time they took land. And, second, they had superior knowledge of
the anticipated consequences of their actions, so that on balance
' 40
the use of the eminent domain power maximized social welfare.'
Since neither of these conditions hold universally, Epstein pointed
to courts' ability to examine exercise of the eminent domain power,
noting that "[tihere is no substitute for taking a careful look at the
relevant deals" in assessing whether takings are legitimate exercises
of public power or not.'14 If legislatures are inadequate guarantors
and the political process vulnerable, the best protection comes from
constitutional provisions enforced by the courts.
Two conclusions are possible from the overall pattern of results
found here. First, the division between states that adopted substantive
eminent domain reforms and those that adopted either no reforms or
purely symbolic reforms appears to be driven to a large extent by the
cost of the reforms to politicians. The pattern of significance and
sign on the various coefficients points in this direction with variables related to the cost of reform appearing reliably significant and
with the correct signs to support this interpretation. Second, there
is a partisan divide between Republicans and Democrats in the state
legislatures in passing substantive eminent domain reform despite
the bipartisan nature of immediate post-Kelo denunciations. This
suggests that the interest groups opposed to eminent domain reform
are most likely to have operated through back channels, seeking
amendments and revisions to weaken reform proposals rather than
directly opposing legislation. Since those interest groups (officials of
declining metropolitan area governments and environmentalists) are
predominantly linked to the Democratic party, greater Democratic
control of the state legislature increased the chances of such changes.
Further research is needed in developing better measures of political
competitiveness and the presence of declining metropolitan areas.
l31Id at 18-19.
" Epstein, 8 Green Bag 2d at 359 (cited in note 6).
14'
Epstein, 9 Green Bag 2d at 130 (cited in note 7).

